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Abstract1 
It is rarely possible in practice to draw a clear distinction between bilateral and multilateral 
aid, as there are overlaps between them and they are often delivered in special forms. 
Moreover, aid delivered by EU (European Union) institutions differs from multilateral 
forms of aid. 
Essentially, there are two perspectives on multilateral aid as a system. The first says that it 
represents a functioning ‘patchwork’ approach to global challenges. The second claims 
that it is severely fragmented and inefficient. It is against this backdrop that this article 
analyses the structural changes taking place within multilateral aid and their implications 
for the quality of aid. 
Keywords: Development cooperation, multilateral development cooperation, effective-
ness, fragmentation, proliferation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1 This paper is to be published in German in Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (ZfAS). 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 A topic with fresh relevance? 
Research into development and (Official Development Assistance (ODA)2 typically deals 
only in passing with multilateral aid, tending to focus instead on overarching issues, such 
as the contribution made by aid to economic growth, the impact of aid on governance sys-
tems in partner countries, and the effectiveness of different aid approaches and instru-
ments (such as programme financing), as well as on individual players such as the World 
Bank Group and the EU.  
Nonetheless, issues relating directly and indirectly to the multilateral system have been 
receiving more and more attention over the past five years or so. The impetus for the pre-
sent study has come from both aid practitioners and development researchers. There are 
two main, partially overlapping debates in this context. The first concerns the interest ex-
pressed by donor countries in new, evidence-based analyses of the work carried out by 
individual multilateral institutions. Given that half of the members of the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) regularly review the balance between their bilateral and multilateral aid 
allocations,3 donors use these analyses as evidence in deciding how to allocate funding. 
The second debate surrounds the longer-term proliferation in the number of aid players 
(Zimmermann / Smith 2011; Severino / Ray 2009). This trend involves a range of players, 
such as private actors (primarily foundations) and emerging economies such as China, 
India and Mexico in their role as new donors, and ultimately the growth in the number of 
multilateral financing mechanisms. The rising number of players has fostered a perception 
of the aid system as fragmented and disadvantageous. Among the reasons for this are effi-
ciency losses caused by high transaction costs. Eighty per cent of all low-income countries 
(LICs) registered an increase in the number of donors between 2004 and 2009, some of 
them actually recording rises of over 50 per cent (OECD 2012, 122). Some observers 
(such as Reisen 2009) consider the number of multilateral players to be one of the main 
reasons for the fragmentation of the aid system.4 By contrast, other analyses see precisely 
the opposite situation in terms of structure, with a stronger overall concentration of multi-
lateral aid leading to less fragmentation than with bilateral donors.5  
1.2 Distinctions and overlaps 
One of the fundamental distinctions in the provision of aid is that between bilateral and 
multilateral aid. This suggests that certain aid characteristics differ according to whether 
the donor is an individual state (i.e. providing bilateral aid) or an international institution 
(i.e. providing multilateral aid). 
                                                            
2 The term ‘aid’ is used in this paper as a synonym for ODA. 
3 Eleven out of 23 DAC members say that they review the balance between their bilateral and multilateral aid 
allocations every three to five years (OECD 2012, 30). 
4 Consequently, Reisen (2009) refers to a ‘multilateral donor non-system’. 
5 See OECD (2012) and the more detailed explanations later on in this paper. 
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As an aid category, the term ‘multilateral aid’ refers to programmes in which contributions 
from individual donors are pooled, forming part of the service provided by an internation-
al donor institution.6 In practice, it is rarely possible to draw a clear distinction between 
bilateral aid and multilateral aid, as there are overlaps between them and special forms 
(such as multi-bi aid)7 also exist, alongside EU development cooperation and international 
agreements that lead to the use of sectoral and regional quotas for bilateral aid (Klingebiel 
2012). For example, there is a growing tendency to earmark funding for multilateral insti-
tutions for specific purposes, with the result that these institutions and their supervisory 
bodies are no longer able to decide how the funds should be used. At the same time, inter-
national fora are becoming increasingly important in deciding how funding from individu-
al donors should be spent – on certain groups of countries or sectors, for instance. This 
may be interpreted as a process in which international decisions (many of which are mere-
ly of an advisory nature) are intended to influence the allocation decisions taken by bilat-
eral donors.  
1.3 Scope and relevance8 
Based on core contributions to multilateral institutions (including the EU), the OECD’s 
DAC donors provide just under 30 per cent of their ODA in the form of multilateral aid 
(2011: 27 per cent or USD 37.6bn). This percentage used to be higher in certain years 
(2001: 33 per cent). The proportion of multilateral aid provided by DAC members varies 
greatly from country to country. The United States, the world’s largest donor, provides by 
far the smallest proportion of aid for multilateral institutions (11.5 per cent in 2011), 
whereas Italy supplies the highest proportion (56.7 per cent). Germany is in the upper 
middle range, supplying 34.4 per cent of its ODA in the form of multilateral aid (OECD 
2013b).9 
The past few years have seen a marked increase in aid provided via multilateral channels 
that is earmarked for specific purposes, sectors or countries. This is the approach adopted 
by some bilateral donors for undertaking specific projects (including small-scale activi-
ties). Consequently, this aid is not truly multilateral as, despite being issued via multilat-
eral mechanisms, it is not supplied to the international institutions in the form of core con-
tributions10 (‘bilateralisation of multilateral aid’). Multi-bi aid currently accounts for 12 
per cent of total ODA (USD 16.5bn; 2011) and this figure is increasing rapidly (OECD 
2013b). A number of donors, including Australia, Canada and the United States, are 
providing more multi-bi aid than core contributions. The disadvantages of multi-bi aid are 
                                                            
6 See the OECD definition of multilateral aid. According to this definition, multilateral aid must fulfil three 
criteria, one of them being that it ‘pools contributions so that they lose their identity and become an integral 
part of its financial assets’ (OECD 2011a, p. 23). The other two criteria are as follows: multilateral ODA is a 
core contribution made to a recipient institution that a) conducts all or part of its activities in favour of devel-
opment; b) is an international agency, institution, or organisation whose members are governments, or a fund 
managed autonomously by such an agency. 
7 Aid earmarked for specific purposes. More details are given later on in this paper. 
8 Unless otherwise indicated, figures are taken from OECD 2011a. 
9 The reasons for this pattern are discussed later on in this paper. 
10 That is, aid not earmarked for a specific purpose. 
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considerable and far outweigh any benefits (e.g. as a means of trialling certain approach-
es). This is particularly true of non-core contributions from a single donor (‘a single trust 
fund’) as opposed to non-core financing from a number of donors (‘multi-donor trust 
funds’). For example, non-core contributions raise transaction costs and undermine the 
governance structures of multilateral institutions, potentially contributing to the watering 
down of institutional mandates, as actors are given incentives to take on a wide range of 
different tasks (OECD 2012, 47–49). 
‘New donors’ have adopted a variety of stances in relation to multilateral aid. Most EU 
member states who are not DAC members lack their own implementation structures and 
supply a relatively high proportion of their aid via the EU. Russia and Brazil primarily use 
regional mechanisms, while China and India favour bilateral approaches (OECD 2011a, p. 
34; UNDESA 2010). 
Figure 1: Relevance of bilateral, multilateral and multi-bi aid (USD million, 2010) 
 
Source: OECD (2013a) 
1.4 Multilateral aid players 
Multilateral aid players differ in terms of their importance, remit and regional or sectoral 
focus. In terms of the volume of available aid, the EU institutions are the dominant play-
ers, along with development banks (such as the International Development Association) 
and regional banks (such as the African Development Bank). A number of players work at 
global level, while others focus on specific regions. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tu-
berculosis and Malaria is a vertical fund and one of the key actors in multilateral aid. 
There is also a separation of tasks at multilateral level (in important areas at least) into 
development finance (performed by development banks) on the one hand and technical 
cooperation (undertaken by UN funds and programmes) on the other. 
Bilateral ODA (excl. multi-bi)
= 82.4 billion
Multi-bi / non-core = 16.7 billion
Multilateral ODA = 37.6 billion
2010 Total ODA (excl. Debt relief) = 136.7 bn
Total bilateral ODA = 72% of ODA
Total use of multilateral organisations
= 40% of ODA
Multilateral ODA = 28% of ODA
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With around 210 organisations, funds and trust funds active in the field, there clearly are a 
large number of multilateral aid players.11 However, most activity is concentrated around 
five clusters of players who administer 81 per cent (2006–2010 average) of all multilateral 
aid donated by DAC members (OECD 2013a, 12): 
• European Development Fund (EDF) and EU aid budget (36 per cent) 
• International Development Association (IDA) (World Bank Group) (22 per cent) 
• UN funds and programmes (9 per cent) 
• Asian Development Bank and African Development Bank (3-5 per cent) 
• Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (7 per cent) 
The remaining multilateral institutions account for just 19 per cent of overall multilateral aid. 
1.5 The specific role of the EU 
Aid from EU institutions, financed through the European Development Fund and, to a 
lesser extent, the EU budget, amounts to around 18 per cent of all aid provided by EU 
member states who are members of the DAC. The European Commission is the largest 
donor within the EU (Klingebiel 2012). Aid from EU institutions amounted to USD 13bn 
in 2010. EU member states who are members of the DAC account for over half (55 per 
cent in 2010) of the total global aid provided by DAC members (OECD 2011b, 140 and 
154–155).  
As a supranational donor, the EU is a special case and may be classified only to a very 
limited extent as a provider of multilateral aid.12 The EU is the only DAC member to per-
form three functions:  
(i) it supplies its own aid to developing countries; 
(ii) it acts as a donor to multilateral institutions, passing on funding; 
(iii) it serves as a catalyst between member states and the European Commission, ensur-
ing that they coordinate their dealings with multilateral institutions and partner 
countries. 
All in all, the aid provided by the EU is best understood as a sort of ‘collective bilateral-
ism’, rather than a form of multilateral aid (Klingebiel 1993). This new classification 
could be relevant to donor countries that have set upper limits for aid contributions to mul-
tilateral institutions (OECD 2012, 31). 
                                                            
11 Cf. http://www.oecd.org/dac/aid-architecture/12_10_02 per cent20Policy per cent20Briefing per cent20on 
per cent20Multilateral per cent20Aid_draft_final_draft per cent20 per cent282 per cent29.pdf, accessed on 
14 March 2013. 
12  As the 2011 DAC Report states, ‘Even though it is often presented as a multilateral in DAC publications, the 
EU is an individual donor with its own development policy and resources.’ (OECD 2011b, 155). 
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For the EU, the issue of complementarity in relation to aid arises at multiple levels 
(Grimm 2010). The primary focus is on complementarity between the Union and its mem-
ber states. The Maastricht Treaty stipulated that the policies of EU institutions should 
complement those of EU member states. The Lisbon Treaty underscored the EU’s im-
portance as an autonomous donor. The policies of the EU and its member states must now 
complement one another (this is known as ‘shared parallel competences’). Complementa-
rity in aid provision between EU member states is another important dimension that is 
becoming an increasingly prominent topic of debate. 
A range of reforms introduced since the end of the 1990s has significantly improved the 
effectiveness of aid provided collectively by EU institutions (Grimm 2010). The EU and 
its member states face other, significant challenges in coordinating European aid. The EU 
Code of Conduct on Division of Labour (2007) and the Joint Programming initiatives are 
designed to help deal with these challenges. 
2 Multilateral aid: strengths and weaknesses 
2.1 Traditional views on the strengths and weaknesses of bilateral and 
 multilateral aid 
Bilateral aid has a number of advantages from the perspective of individual donor coun-
tries. Donors have far greater direct influence over how the aid is allocated, for example, 
in terms of topics and countries. This affords them greater visibility, both in their own 
countries (vis-à-vis their national parliaments and the general public, for example) and in 
their partner countries. It is also far easier for donor countries to pursue their own interests 
with bilateral aid, for example, by ensuring either directly or indirectly that companies 
from their own countries receive preferential treatment or by using aid as a foreign-policy 
instrument for punishing partner countries. Direct vested interests on the part of donor 
countries usually diminish the development policy benefits that aid is intended to pro-
vide.13 Bilateral donors also exploit their ability to act more quickly and flexibly and with 
less red tape than multilateral actors (Klingebiel 2012). Some donors, such as Switzerland 
and Germany, have set upper limits for the proportion of multilateral aid (OECD 2012, 
31–32) in order to promote bilateral aid, thus allowing them to increase their own visibil-
ity and influence as donor nations. It is hard to show how this kind of automatic limitation 
and the use of fixed quotas generate any development-policy gains in the context of the 
aid effectiveness agenda.  
Multilateral aid is seen as having other advantages and disadvantages, some real and some 
perceived. In certain cases, partner regions have more opportunities to participate in the 
decision-making processes of multilateral aid providers, as they are represented on the 
supervisory boards of these institutions (as is the case with UN funds and programmes). 
This lends greater legitimacy to the corresponding aid programmes in the partner countries 
(Fues / Klingebiel 2007). Multilateral aid leaves far less scope for individual donor coun-
                                                            
13 For example, the lack of international competition means that services tied to donor countries are more ex-
pensive on average and may be poorer in quality than those sourced through international tenders. The cost 
of tied aid is around 15 to 30 per cent higher, and in some cases even 40 per cent higher (as in the case of 
food aid) than the cost of untied aid (Clay et al. 2009, 1). 
Stephan Klingebiel 
6 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
tries to pursue their own interests, making it less politicised and interest-based. As a result, 
multilateral aid can facilitate greater ownership by partner countries. Some studies (Keo-
hane et al. 2009) suggest that multilateral institutions and multilateral aid can also help to 
support democratisation processes in recipient countries, for example, by promoting the 
rights of minorities. 
Pooling resources also generates returns to scale and allows larger-scale tasks to be taken 
on than would be possible with individual bilateral donors, thereby reducing the risk of 
‘projectitis’. The multilateral approach also allows bigger risks (for example, in fragile 
countries) to be accepted than with bilateral aid and reduces the risk of partner countries 
becoming ‘aid orphans’ or ‘aid darlings’, as multilateral mechanisms distribute aid more 
evenly among recipient countries (OECD 2012, 20). Moreover, multilateral actors perform 
different tasks from bilateral donors in some cases. For instance, a number of UN institu-
tions function as leading international standard-setters, a role that bilateral donors are una-
ble to fulfil (Fues / Klingebiel 2007). A significant argument in favour of aid provision by 
EU institutions is that these institutions not only represent another European donor, but to 
an growing extent also coordinate the European aid system (Orbie 2012). 
2.2 Newer aspects of (multilateral) aid 
In addition to the points raised thus far, some of which were already discussed in the 
1960s and 1970s, certain other aspects are becoming increasingly important: 
(i) Aid effectiveness and the perspective of partner countries. It should primarily be the 
partner countries who identify and evaluate the advantages and disadvantages and, 
consequently, the effectiveness of bilateral and multilateral aid (Klingebiel 2012). If a 
fragmented aid system is generally detrimental to partner countries (due to high trans-
action costs, lack of transparency, high overheads for maintaining the system, etc.), 
the first question to ask is not whether bilateral and/or multilateral aid is needed (as 
was often the case in the past), but rather whether the donor’s aid delivery structure is 
effective. Consequently, focusing on whether aid is bilateral or multilateral is only of 
limited benefit, as there are other major issues to consider (such as aid modalities and 
the options for using national systems). 
Multilateral aid or further multilateralisation can therefore be interpreted as a contri-
bution to the aid effectiveness agenda (Manning 2012, p. 10). Supplying ODA 
through multilateral channels generates efficiency gains (as work flows are rational-
ised, resources pooled and so forth). At the same time, research findings point over-
whelmingly to multilateral mechanisms as being an effective means of resource de-
ployment.14 
(ii) New visibility. Against the backdrop of new national procedures (greater significance 
of cross-donor sector dialogue, etc.) and more recent aid approaches to financing pro-
grammes in partner countries (pooled contributions, budget support, etc.), the ques-
tion of whether bilateral aid really provides greater visibility is entering a new dimen-
                                                            
14 See Section 3 for further details. 
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sion. Partner governments and donors represented in partner countries now evaluate 
aid provision far more in terms of its impact on development policy and its integration 
into the partner country’s national processes (Vollmer 2012), rather than in terms of 
the degree to which aid can be attributed to a particular donor. Consequently, individ-
ual projects linked to specific donors play more of a background role and are even 
considered detrimental to development policy in some cases (as they can distort ac-
countability structures). In some instances, budget support and other programme-
financing contributions are a more effective means of gaining visibility in partner 
countries than running conventional, prestigious bilateral projects. Involvement in lo-
cal dialogue processes is becoming a more important means of raising visibility. As a 
result, the classic argument for bilateral aid (i.e. that it secures greater visibility in 
partner countries) is becoming increasingly redundant. 
(iii) Division of labour by country and sector. In the context of the debate on aid effective-
ness, questions about the way in which labour is divided among donors are highly 
topical. One of the effects of bilateral donors seeking to focus their activities on spe-
cific countries is that the number of bilateral donors and the volume of ODA in a 
range of partner countries (a disproportionately high number of which are ‘difficult 
partner countries’) are both on the decline. By contrast, multilateral players – or at 
least the main ones – have a mandate to maintain a broad presence (multilateral aid as 
the donor of last resort).15 The same applies to the way labour is divided among dif-
ferent sectors in partner countries. 
(iv) Global public goods. Development cooperation takes place in a rapidly changing en-
vironment. In the past, development policy challenges were viewed primarily as is-
sues that needed to be dealt with by individual countries. However, this approach is 
barely relevant any longer, as so many issues (such as security, climate change, mi-
gration and food security) cross national borders. More and more development policy 
tasks are being addressed in connection with the provision of public goods (Kaul et al. 
2003; Kaul 2013).   
 
Multilateral actors are at an advantage when it comes to helping to provide global and 
regional public goods, as they ought to be better placed to address the difficulties 
caused by collective action than a large number of individual states with many differ-
ent approaches. 
(v) Standards. The Millennium Development Goals and the aid effectiveness agenda both 
serves as examples16 of how only multilateral organisations have the universal legiti-
macy that is required to set international standards for global, regional and national 
policies (to be pursued by partner countries, donors and so forth).  
 
                                                            
15 DFID, for instance, now works with only 28 countries (DFID 2012, 8), while the EU is active in some 150 
countries (UK Parliament 2012). 
16 Efforts are consequently being made to involve the UN more in the international debate on aid effectiveness. 
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3 The effectiveness of multilateral aid 
There are two main ways of assessing the effectiveness of multilateral aid. The first is to 
conduct targeted performance analyses of the multilateral system or of individual multi-
lateral institutions. The second is to use indicators introduced by the OECD over the past 
few years. 
3.1 Performance analyses 
Over the past five to ten years or so, increasing efforts have been made to evaluate the 
effectiveness of donors more systematically. In certain cases, these efforts have focused 
specifically on multilateral institutions. The main analyses include: 
• Evaluations based on the Paris Declaration, using relevant aid effectiveness indicators. 
However, the most comprehensive study conducted on this basis, i.e. that by Wood et al 
(2011), does not include development aid provided by the EU and the IDA. 
• The Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN17), set up 
in 2002 and comprising 17 donor countries with a common interest in assessing the 
effectiveness of multilateral aid. MOPAN conducts four to six joint analyses each 
year (OECD 2013a). 
• The Quality of Official Development Assistance Assessment (QuODA) (Birdsall and 
Kharas 2010), comparing 31 bilateral and multilateral donors. 
• Donor studies and reports on the multilateral system, such as the Multilateral Aid Re-
view conducted by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), in 
2011. Similar studies have been carried out by Australia, the Netherlands and Sweden 
(OECD 2013a, 22; OECD 2013b). The German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-
operation and Development (BMZ 2013) has devised three criteria for systematically 
evaluating multilateral organisations:  
(i) the organisation’s development-policy relevance or mandate;  
(ii) organisational performance;  
(iii) the options available to Germany for exerting influence.  
• Unlike the MOPAN network, analyses of individual donors differ from one another, 
as they are heavily influenced by each donor’s preferences (priorities which may not 
form part of the institution’s profile, which do not necessarily correspond with the ra-
tionale and focus of the multilateral institution. 
• Reports on individual players (such as Bigsten et al. 2011 on the EU). 
Despite the studies already available, there is only limited scope for drawing general con-
clusions on quality distinctions between bilateral and multilateral aid. This is due to the 
huge diversity in donor groups (bilateral and multilateral) and the wide variety of investi-
gative methods and approaches used.  
                                                            
17 For more details, see http://www.mopanonline.org/. 
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Nonetheless, multilateral aid fairs well on the whole in most of the study findings. For 
example, QuODA shows that, on average, multilateral organisations outperform bilateral 
donors in three out of four aspects of quality (Birdsall / Kharas 2010, 24–25). Most other 
studies confirm these findings (for example, Picciotto 2011).  
So far, it has not been possible to adequately assess how and to what extent studies on the 
performance of multilateral institutions actually influence donor decisions on aid alloca-
tion. Surveys of DAC donors suggest that relevant analyses play a key role when donors 
decide how to allocate aid.18 
A recent public opinion poll of EU citizens revealed that they perceive partnerships be-
tween international organisations as delivering higher quality than bilateral programmes. 
In 26 of the 27 EU member states, citizens felt that major international organisations de-
livered better quality than bilateral players (OECD 2012, 30). At the same time, research 
findings for the United States (Milner / Tingley 2012) show that there is little public sup-
port for multilateral aid, despite the evidence of its effectiveness. This lack of support fol-
lows from the principal-agent model, with its fundamental conflict of aims between effi-
cient and effective aid allocation on the one hand (in favour of the agent, i.e. the World 
Bank) and loss of control by the principal (in this case the United States) on the other. In 
other words, while there may be a degree of confidence in the multilateral system, the lim-
ited options for control mean that it enjoys only limited support. 
3.2 Performance indicators 
A large number of indicators, primarily input-related, have been used for data capture and 
research to date, with a view to evaluating donors. These have included the total volume 
of ODA, regional, income-related and sectoral allocation indicators, allocation to instru-
ments and tendering processes (proportion of humanitarian aid, tied aid). 
These indicators have been complemented by more recent data from the OECD regarding 
the following quantitative and qualitative aspects of aid provision: 
1) Country Programmable Aid (CPA) is a response to criticism that partner countries 
have only limited control over much of the aid designated as ODA. Recipient coun-
tries have very little or no scope, for example, to use funding provided by donor coun-
tries to pay for university places for their citizens. CPA is a sub-category of ODA that 
does not include certain ODA-eligible donor expenses (such as administration costs), 
and thus provides a clearer indication of the potential benefits of ODA from the part-
ner country’s perspective (OECD 2013c). The average CPA figures for multilateral 
institutions and EU institutions are significantly higher than those for bilateral ODA 
provided by DAC donors. In 2010, CPA accounted for 74.0 per cent of all aid provid-
ed by multilateral organisations (excluding the EU), 72.5 per cent of that provided by 
EU institutions, and 55.1 per cent of the bilateral aid provided by DAC donors.19 
                                                            
18 See the findings of a DAC donor survey on multilateral aid cited by the OECD (OECD 2012, 32). 
19 Figures based on OECD data (2013b).  
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2) The OECD has published a number of quantitative analyses over the past few years 
measuring the ‘significance of an aid relation’, the ‘concentration ratio’20 and the 
‘fragmentation ratio’21 (see OECD 2011c and 2012). These analyses make it difficult 
to evaluate the performance of donors for a number of reasons.22 Nonetheless, the 
available data suggest that, relatively speaking, fragmentation phenomena are more 
common in relation to bilateral aid than in relation to multilateral aid: there is a donor 
aid concentration ratio of 65 per cent23 for multilateral aid including the EU (62 per 
cent excluding the EU), but just 54 per cent for bilateral aid supplied by DAC coun-
tries (OECD 2013a, 22) 
Table 1: Profile and aid provision of multilateral institutions (core contributions, 2010) 
 
CPA+* 
(USD  
million) 
Share of 
global 
CPA+* 
(as %) 
No. of  
relation-
ships 
No. of  
significant 
relation-
ships 
Concen-
tration 
ratio 
(as %) 
Total multilaterals 34 360 35.7 1 594 1 030 65 
Total multilaterals excl. EU 24 485 25.5 1 445 902 62 
EU institutions** 9 875 10.3 149 128 86 
Global Fund 2 997 3.1 113 73 65 
International Development 
Association (IDA) 10 074 10.5 78 70 90 
International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) (concessional trust fund) 1 346 1.4 37 29 78 
Regional development bank funds: 4 174 4.3 104 94 90 
African Development Fund 
(AfDF) 1 515 1.6 38 31 82 
Asian Development Fund (AsDF) 1 927 2.0 27 25 93 
Caribbean Development Bank 
(CarDB) 69 0.1 14 14 100 
Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB) 662 0.7 25 24 96 
                                                            
20 Significant relationships with partner countries from a donor’s perspective as a proportion of the total num-
ber of relationships.  
21 Significant relationships with donor countries from a partner country’s perspective as a proportion of the 
total number of relationships.  
22 The decision as to whether a partner country would benefit most from a financially significant or a non-
financially significant aid relationship also depends on a range of other factors, which may even be more 
significant (for example, potentially low transaction costs in the case of smaller financial contributions made 
to highly harmonised programmes). The question of whether multilateral institutions have a universal or re-
gional mandate (compare the universal approach of UN funds and programmes to the work of regional 
banks) is vital when it comes to the number of partner countries they work with. 
23 The aid concentration ratio measures the number of a donor’s significant aid relationships relative to the total 
number of its aid relationships. 
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Table 1 (cont.): Profile and aid provision of multilateral institutions (core contributions, 2010) 
 
CPA+* 
(USD  
million) 
Share of 
global 
CPA+* 
(as %) 
No. of  
relation-
ships 
No. of  
significant 
relation-
ships 
Concen-
tration 
ratio 
(as %) 
UN funds and programmes: 2 438 2.5 534 288 54 
United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) 515 0.5 136 75 55 
United Nations Population Fund 
(UNFPA) 282 0.3 117 75 64 
United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 187 0.2 86 43 50 
United Nations International Chil-
dren’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) 768 0.8 120 51 43 
United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency (UNRWA) 452 0.5 4 4 100 
World Food Programme (WFP) 235 0.2 71 40 56 
Other UN: 615 0.6 298 201 67 
International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) 51 0.05 98 67 68 
International Fund for Agricul-
tural Development (IFAD) 462 0.48 79 53 67 
Joint United Nations Programme 
on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) 51 0.05 103 65 63 
UN Peacebuilding Fund 51 0.05 18 16 89 
Total DAC countries 61 764 64.3 1 719 933 54 
Total DAC members incl. EU 71 639 74.5 1 868 1 061 57 
* Note that this analysis also includes humanitarian and food aid, but excludes regional allocations from CPA. 
** The EU is a member of the DAC and has its own development policy. It is presented in this table as a multilateral 
agency since contributions to the EU are considered as constituting multilateral ODA. 
Source: OECD 2013a 
4 Conclusion 
In the past, there were essentially two implicit views of the multilateral aid system. One 
perspective regarded the system as a functioning patchwork approach to tackling global 
challenges. The wealth of examples of a lack of coherence in the multilateral system do 
not necessarily imply that it does not generate potential synergies among the various mul-
tilateral players enabling them to tackle the many different global, regional and national 
challenges. Rather, the multitude of tasks and problems requires the involvement of dif-
ferent players, leading to a lack of uniformity in implementing solutions.  
Stephan Klingebiel 
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The other perspective viewed the multilateral system as plagued by a loss of effectiveness 
and by fragmentation. According to this view, the system is characterised by a wide range 
of players who often take on overlapping tasks with very little coordination and who fre-
quently lack sufficient resources. This leads to a loss of efficiency and effectiveness 
(transaction costs, diminished impact, etc.) in the provision of aid to partner countries. 
The aid system as a whole is indeed characterised by a proliferation of players. Multilat-
eral mechanisms are part of the system and contribute to losses of efficiency and effec-
tiveness, even though bilateral donors are responsible for greater losses. Consequently, it 
is helpful to view multilateral institutions in relation to all other types of donors, rather 
than in isolation.  
A range of studies carried out in the past few years24 have helped to create a better under-
standing of the multilateral system and the players involved in it. These analyses have 
made clear that multilateral aid has a positive overall impact, despite the existence of a big 
performance gap between certain institutions. The findings do not support the assertion 
that the quality of multilateral aid is inadequate.  
Building on these findings, future research should examine the impact these studies have 
had on donors’ aid allocation decisions. Do they affect donor preferences and the deci-
sions taken by donor governments and parliaments? Or do other criteria have a greater 
bearing on allocation decisions? 
A clear trend towards the use of the multilateral system for pursuing specific donor inter-
ests has emerged over the past few years. This is reflected by the way in which financing 
behaviour has changed, with goals first being set by individual donors and then imple-
mented by multilateral institutions as part of multi-bi aid. The trend is reinforced by donor 
countries who commission performance analyses that relate to their own individual goal 
system, rather than to the goal system of the multilateral institution through which they are 
working. This serves to reduce the advantages associated with multilateral donors, thereby 
decreasing the overall benefits. As such, this trend underscores the difficulty of transfer-
ring the current aid system to a more comprehensive system of global public policies 
(Severino 2013). 
The issue of how best to distribute EU aid is an important aspect of the allocation debate 
(on bilateral and multilateral priorities) among European donors. Overall, it is clear that 
there is a wide gap between the aid activities performed by European institutions and the 
work of multilateral players. The EU is a political alliance that functions as an autono-
mous player in dealings with multilateral institutions (such as the United Nations). Its 
member states have far greater influence than individual donors working through multilat-
eral institutions, which have different governance structures. This difference in approach 
between multilateral organisations and the EU should be taken into account in aid practice 
(for example, in the presentation of bilateral and multilateral aid). 
 
                                                            
24 See Section 3. 
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